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Chapter 2
HOW MUCH REAL DOLLAR
DEPRECIATION IS NEEDED TO
CORRECT GLOBAL IMBALANCES?
1. Introduction
In the mainstream view, a weak dollar is the natural
consequence of the long string of large and increasing
current account deficits run by the US in the past
decade. In ten years, from 1997 to 2007, the current
account deficit of the US increased from 1.7 percent
of US GDP to 1.7 percent of world output.
Already in 2000, leading economists such as Maurice
Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff warned that adjustment
would require substantial depreciation of the dollar in
real terms and on a multilateral basis. Specifically,
based on a stylised model, Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2005) showed that eliminating a current account
deficit of 5 percent of GDPin an economy like the US
would require that economy’s real exchange rate to
depreciate between 35 and 50 percent.1 Meanwhile,
from its peak in 2002 to the beginning of 2008, the
dollar lost almost one third of its value in real terms
(CPI based). Against the major currencies the fall was
much more pronounced: about 40 percent in real
terms – mirroring the strong appreciation of the euro
(up to 50 percent!).
Questions such as “How much dollar depreciation
should Europe and the world expect in the future as a
consequence of the US imbalance?” or “To what
extent will the dollar fall be accompanied by a glob-
al realignment of Asian currencies, supposedly
reducing the pressure on the euro?” are in every-
body’s mind, and rightly so. Yet, to a large extent the
answer to these questions builds on some under-
standing of the specific mechanisms by which real
dollar depreciation is an essential step towards glob-
al adjustment. After all, it is these mechanisms that
will shape the macroeconomic outlook in the next
few years. 
In what follows, we reconsider the argument that the
US currency must weaken substantially in real terms
to correct the US current external imbalance. The
emphasis here is on “real terms”, because what counts
in the adjustment process is the movement of the price
of US goods relative to goods produced in the rest of
the world. 
Addressing this issue is important because estimates
of the real dollar depreciation required for a correc-
tion of global imbalances provide a natural anchor for
trends in the currency market. The world has already
experienced ample swings in the dollar-euro ex-
change rate. Early on in the decade this rate almost
reached 80 dollar cents per euro; it may well be pos-
sible that the parity will fall as low as 1.60 dollars per
euro. But would the exchange rate then remain per-
sistently at these extreme levels? 
The text below will emphasise that the largest esti-
mates of real dollar depreciation (such as the ones by
Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005 mentioned above) are
based on models which typically assume a strong
adjustment in the domestic relative prices of non-trad-
able goods (say, services) within the US and abroad.
Strong movements in these prices relative to interna-
tional prices are clearly possible, but they would be
unprecedented by historical standards, and are not
supported by econometric evidence. In addition, it is
hard to think that large movements in domestic prices
would fail to create strong incentives to reallocate
production across sectors (away from the non-trad-
ables sector), which would in turn reduce the need for
price movements.
The chapter concludes by discussing two recent con-
tributions that reconsider the mechanisms underlying
current account adjustment, pointing to much milder
scenarios of real dollar depreciation (Dekle et al. 2007
and Corsetti et al. 2008). Carrying out exercises sim-
ilar in spirit to those of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005
and 2007), these new contributions confirm the pre-
sumption that closing the US current account imbal-
1 The assessment of the real dollar depreciation required to correct glob-
al imbalances carried out by international organisations was often less
extreme. As of 2006, the IMF had constructed scenarios with real effec-
tive dollar depreciation in the range of 15 percent, under the so-called
soft-landing scenario. See, for example, IMF (2006), Box 1.3. Similar
estimates are discussed in Faruqee et al. (2007)ance will require the dollar to weaken persistently in
real terms. But the depreciation required for a sus-
tainable current account adjustment would be much
lower. The results suggest that a real dollar deprecia-
tion of between 10 and 20 percent may well be
enough (see also Corsetti 2007).
What does this mean for Europe? Early assessments
of the equilibrium exchange rate between the euro
and the dollar, especially the ones based on purchas-
ing power parity, by and large pointed to values
between 0.90 and 1.30 dollars per euro,2 an interval
also suggested by Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1. Our con-
clusion is that at the beginning of 2008 the real
exchange rate between the euro and the dollar has
already reached, and probably overshot, the value
needed for global rebalancing – especially if Asian
countries end their (explicit or implicit) peg to the
dollar. 
2. The ABC of dollar depreciation: terms of trade
versus internal price adjustment
The 2005 EEAG Report already discussed in great
detail different views on what lies at the heart of
the emergence of global imbalances in the 1990s,
and the implications of such imbalances for
Europe. That report also included a synthetic intro-
duction to the ABC of dollar depreciation and
external adjustment according to leading models.
To introduce our new argument, it is worth recon-
sidering once again the role of relative price move-
ments in rebalancing the external account. The
starting point consists of a definition and simple
national accounting.3
To begin with, recall that the real exchange rate is the
price of US consumption relative to consumption
abroad. It is customarily measured by multiplying the
nominal exchange rate by the ratio of domestic to for-
eign CPI. The CPI, of course, includes both goods that
are traded across the border and goods that are not
traded because their value is too small relative to
(international) trade costs. Hence, real exchange rate
movements can be roughly decomposed into changes
in the relative price of traded goods produced at home
and abroad, that is, the terms of trade, and changes in
the price of non-traded goods in terms of traded
goods.
As regards national accounting, the simplest identity
states that the value of a country’s total domestic
demand plus net exports must be equal to the value of
its output:
Value of Domestic Demand + Value of Net Exports =
Value of GDP
For our purposes, it is useful to rewrite this identity as
follows. First, net exports are replaced with some tar-
get level of current account adjustment, that is, of an
assessment by how much adjustment would be
required to correct the external imbalances. As a ref-
erence estimate, consider an adjustment up to 5 per-
centage points of GDP, which would correspond to a
de facto elimination of the US external imbalance.
Second, in order to highlight the role of relative price
adjustment, demand and GDP are broken down into
two components, distinguishing between traded and
non-traded goods. We obtain:
PNDN + PTDT + DF + Current Account Adjustment =
PTYT + PNYN
In this identity, PN and PT denote the prices of US
non-tradables and US tradables, respectively, both
expressed in terms of US imports (which consist of
foreign tradables); DN, DT and  DF denote the US
demand for domestic non-tradables, domestic trad-
ables and foreign tradables (imports); YN and  YT
denote US output of non-tradables and tradables. 
With the different components of output and demand
spelled out explicitly, the above identity is useful to
capture the essence of the adjustment mechanism.
The logic of this mechanism is straightforward.
Reducing the US deficit is equivalent to a transfer of
resources from the US to the rest of the world.
Adjustment thus requires a decrease in US demand
relative to production, matched by an increase in
demand relative to output in the rest of the world.
Such global reallocation of demand in turn requires a
change in relative prices as well as a change in rela-
tive income and wealth.
To see the role of relative price adjustment most clear-
ly, assume that all quantities produced in the world
(the Y’s in the above identity) remain constant before
and after the adjustment. This means that the whole
adjustment mechanism works through prices and
EEAG Report 62
Chapter 2
2 See Chinn and Alquist (2000), Alberola et al. (2002), Maeso-Fernandez
et. al (2002), and Rosenberg (2003) among others.
3 The model below draws on the economics of “transfer”, referring to
the classic controversy between Keynes (1919, 1929a,b,c) and Ohlin
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demand movements (the P’s and the D’s in the identi-
ty). This is essentially the exercise proposed by
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005).
For a given output, current account adjustment
requires all prices to move in equilibrium. The rela-
tive price of US tradable goods (PT) must fall to
raise foreign demand for US exports, and discour-
age US demand for imports (causing a fall in DF).
But, other things equal, cheaper US tradables would
mean that US households and firms will demand
more of them, at the expense of their demand for US
non-tradables. As the supply of these goods is given
by assumption, the relative price of US non-trad-
ables (PN) must also fall, to ensure that domestic
demand for US non-tradables will be high enough to
meet their supply.
Astriking result in the Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005)
calculations concerns the relative magnitude of the
price changes for tradables and non-tradables,
once reasonable demand elasticities for different
types of goods are used to calibrate the model.
These authors propose the following scenario.
Holding output quantities fixed, the fall in the
international price of US tradables (that is the
adjustment in the terms of trade) accounts for a
real dollar depreciation of between 5 and 15 per-
cent; the change in the relative price of non-trad-
ables accounts for a real dollar depreciation of
between 20 and 30 percent. In this scenario, it is
the change in the latter relative price which clear-
ly makes up the lion’s share. The movement in
non-tradables prices could be several times larger
than changes in the terms of trade. 
To understand the concrete
meaning of these estimates, it is
important to keep in mind that
services are mostly non-trad-
ables, while manufactured
goods are mostly tradables; over
time, productivity differentials
across sectors cause the price of
services to fall steadily in terms
of the price of manufactured
goods, as predicted by the Har-
rod-Balassa-Samuelson hypo-
thesis, amply discussed in the
2002 EEAG Report. The reason-
ing above suggests that for the
US to eliminate its current
account deficit, the price of US
services should fall by up to one third relative to
trend, in terms of the (mostly traded) US manufac-
turing goods.
To be accurate, it should also be stressed that the
above scenario is not the only possible outcome of
adjustment. According to the model used in the above
calculation, there are different ways in which a given
real dollar depreciation can occur: real depreciation
can result from, say, a sharp increase in the price of
non-tradables in the rest of the world, as opposed to a
fall in the US. The calculations in the example by
Obstfeld and Rogoff nonetheless raise an important
issue: how much internal relative price adjustment in
the US can be anticipated in a process of external
adjustment? 
3. Is a sizeable change in internal prices likely to 
happen in the US?
Some insight on the different dynamics of relative
price movements at the domestic and international
level can be gained by reconsidering previous
episodes of real depreciation and current account
adjustment. We first review a case study, then some
econometric evidence.
The most relevant episode for our purpose is clearly
the one experienced by the US in the mid-1980s. After
a period of substantial appreciation associated with
current account imbalances, the dollar started to depre-
ciate in 1985, and fell throughout 1989, after which it
roughly stabilised. The current account initially deteri-
orated somewhat, then stabilised in 1986–87, and
Figure 2.1eventually started to improve from 1988, with a three-
year delay from the beginning of the dollar deprecia-
tion phase. These patterns are illustrated by Figure 2.1,
which plots US net exports (whose behaviour are very
similar to the current account) together with the US
terms of trade and the real exchange rate of the dollar
(both CPI and PPI-based), measured against an aggre-
gate of other OECD countries. The episode of the US
current account adjustment in the 1980s, and the
debate around it, is discussed in great detail by
Krugman (1991) among others. 
In the three-year period going from the beginning
of 1985 to the beginning of 1988, the dollar depre-
ciated in real terms by about 50 percent against the
rest of the OECD countries, as opposed to a cumu-
lative appreciation as high as 15 percent in the pre-
ceding three years. On a multilateral basis (consid-
ering all trade partners of the US), the correspond-
ing figures are 35 percent and 20 percent, respec-
tively. From 1988 on, in real terms the dollar fluc-
tuated around the new, weaker level for a long time,
well into the 1990s.
Further insight into the role of prices can be gained by
looking at Figure 2.2, which plots the US terms of trade
together with the relative price of non-tradables. The
latter is proxied by the ratio of the US Consumer Price
Index for Services and the US Producer Price Index
(PPI). The figure also includes a linear trend through
(our proxy for) the relative price of non-tradables.
Over the whole period displayed in Figure 2.2, the
CPI for services kept increasing steadily in terms
of the PPI. The trend line captures the secular rela-
tive price increase of non-tradables. Compared to
this trend, however, the figure unveils interesting
patterns.
First, remarkably, the rate of increase in the relative
price of non-tradables actually became faster in a
two-year window after 1985, when the dollar was
depreciating sharply, relative to the period before
1985, when the dollar was still appreciating.4 This
(admittedly temporary) acceleration seems at odds
with the model discussed above, as this predicts that
the price of non-tradables would actually weaken
together with the real exchange rate during phases of
external adjustment. 
Nonetheless, one should observe that in the three-year
period after 1985, the US external deficit did stabilise
but did not narrow. Asignificant change in both inter-
nal prices and external deficit, consistent with the
argument illustrated by Obstfeld and Rogoff, eventu-
ally occurred, but only over the last two years of the
decade. It was only then that the price of non-trad-
ables rose at a much lower rate relative to trend, and
the current account started to show significant im-
provement.
The lesson to draw from these considerations is not
straightforward. On the one hand, consistent with
the leading model of current account adjustment,
there was a notable correction of the non-tradables
prices around the time when the current account sta-
bilised and started to improve, that is, between 1987
and 2000. 
One the other hand, Figure 2.2 also highlights a
marked movement of the price of
non-tradables in the opposite
direction immediately after the
beginning of dollar depreciation,
especially between 1986 and
1987. In light of the strong rela-
tive-price increase for non-trad-
ables in those two years, the
reversal in the following years
appears less striking, as it may
correspond, at least in part, to an
offsetting movement. Obviously,
cyclical considerations heavily




4 A similar picture emerges if one looks at
different proxies for non-tradable prices,
such as the ratio of the CPI to the price of
capital equipment. For this indicator, there is
no change in dynamics in the three-year
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Most strikingly, Figure 2.1 shows that the real
exchange rate remained strongly correlated with the
US terms of trade before and over the entire adjust-
ment period. In Figure 2.1, the two international
prices closely track each other. In the period
1985–1987, for instance, the US terms of trade
(based on export deflators) deteriorated by about
40 percent against OECD trade partners, against a
50 percent decline in the real exchange rate. As
shown by Figure 2.2, over this period of dollar and
US current account adjustment in the 1980s, the
terms of trade varied substantially more than internal
relative prices. 
So, while the experiences from the 1980s suggest that
movements in domestic relative prices of non-trad-
able in the US were eventually consistent with the
model, the size of these movements were quite con-
tained, and in any case significantly smaller than the
corresponding movements in the terms of trade. 
These conclusions are backed by empirical estimates
of the effects of deficits on the terms of trade and the
relative price of non-tradables. According to the base-
line econometric results for the G3 countries by
Galstyan (2007), for instance, the percentage deterio-
ration in the terms of trade in response to a reduction
in the external deficit is three times larger than the
percentage fall in the price of non-tradables (4.7 ver-
sus 1.6). Remarkably, this ratio is similar for other
countries.
In light of this evidence, it is not surprising to find
that also now there is little or no evidence of strong
internal relative price adjustment in the US, despite
the large slide in the external value of the dollar
since 2002. The rate of price increase for services
has constantly outpaced the rates of price increase
for other broad categories of goods in the US:
between the end of 2002 and the end of 2006, the
CPI for services has increased by 12.8 percent, more
than 2 percentage points faster than the overall CPI
(10.6 percent), and twice as fast as the CPI exclud-
ing food and energy (6.3 percent). The PPI (exclud-
ing food and energy) rose by even less, by about
5.6 percent. Over the same period, the dollar depre-
ciated by about 15 percent in real effective terms,
although (admittedly) there was hardly any sign of
current account adjustment. 
In the next few years, it is plausible to expect some
effects of dollar depreciation on the relative rate of
price increase by sectors in the US, with the rates of
price increase for non-tradables falling somewhat rel-
ative to the rates of price increase for tradables
(always relative to trends). According to the model,
this should be required for the US external position to
improve in a substantial and sustainable way.
Correspondingly, Europe should expect internal rela-
tive price movements in the opposite direction. It
would be highly unlikely, however, that these differ-
entials in the rates of price increase lead to internal
realignments of dramatic magnitudes.
4. Prices and valuation effects in the global 
rebalancing
Real dollar depreciation also causes “valuation
effects”, that is movements in the value of US in-
comes relative to the rest of the world. To see the
“income side” of the adjustment mechanism dis-
cussed so far, focus on the right-hand side of the
national accounting identity in Section 2 above. For
given output quantities, the fall in the price of both the
US traded and the US non-traded goods relative to
foreign tradable prices lowers the value of US GDP
relative to the value of foreign GDP. Inherent in the
logic of the exercise proposed in the first part of this
text, US residents are relatively poorer because of
price adjustment, even if they produce exactly the
same amount of goods. 
In this respect, real dollar depreciation is akin to a per-
sistent slowdown of US output growth relative to the
rest of the world: in either case the relative value of
US output would fall, reducing US domestic demand
relative to foreign demand, hence making room for
current account adjustment. Those who believe that
the only way to reduce the US external deficit is a
pronounced and persistent US recession essentially
emphasise the role of quantities over prices in driving
down US relative income. 
Now, we have argued above that while the leading
model of current account adjustment attributes rela-
tive wealth and demand effects to strong move-
ments in the average price of non-tradable goods, a
large correction in this relative price is not very
likely in practice. Yet, one could argue that the lead-
ing model is actually right on target, once the
emphasis is placed on the price of housing (after all
houses are non-tradables) rather than on the price of
non-tradable goods and services entering the
Consumer Price Index. 
Indeed, a large correction in the housing prices in the
US per se can generate substantial wealth and demandeffects consistent with external rebalancing – as long
as the fall in these prices hits this country more than
the rest of the world. Not only housing has a large
weight in national wealth. Most importantly, housing
wealth accounts for a very large share of the portfolio
owned by low- and middle-income households, who
arguably have a relatively higher propensity to spend
than richer households. Hence, a fall in housing
wealth can be expected to have a comparatively
stronger impact on final demand than other compo-
nents of national wealth.
One may observe that, starting in 2006, the fall in the
price of housing indeed coincided with an accelera-
tion in the rate of dollar depreciation and a pick-up in
the pace of US net export growth. Assessing the spe-
cific role of housing in the global rebalancing is, how-
ever, quite complex. First, global portfolio diversifi-
cation implies that the losses from a fall in asset prices
in one country are partly borne abroad. At the time of
writing, the amount and distribution across countries
of the direct and indirect losses from the subprime
mortgage crisis in the US is still unclear. Moreover,
the financial turmoil created by this crisis may have
global wealth and output implications well beyond the
direct losses in the mortgage markets. Second, devel-
opments in the housing sector obviously have impor-
tant cyclical consequences for the country as a whole,
driving the current account.
Some of the external effects of a substantial contrac-
tion in real estate markets are direct, via import
demand from the sector. Evidence on this transmis-
sion channel is provided by researchers at the New
York Fed, who examined the year-to-year growth rate
of all non-petroleum imports by the US, and com-
pared this to the growth rate of imports commonly
used as inputs by the residential construction sector
(see Hellerstein 2008). The main findings are
summed up in Figure 2.3 below. The graph shows that
the year-to-year growth rate of housing-related
imports was very dynamic during the years of the
housing “bubble”: it is at least as high, often higher,
than total imports (excluding oil) through late 2006.
From the end of 2006 on, the growth of housing-relat-
ed imports slowed down considerably, once again
moving closely together with total imports. 
In addition to the direct implications for import
demand, a real estate crisis drives the external account
to the extent that it creates a recessionary impulse
(which per se reduces US import demand), and moti-
vates a reaction by the Federal Reserve, in the form of
interest rate cuts (which creates external demand via
dollar depreciation). An analysis of this scenario is
proposed by Krugman (2007). 
These cyclical considerations, including the possibili-
ty of a severe global slowdown induced by a credit
crunch, obviously weigh on the currency market.
Arguably, already in 2007 investors took into account
possible differences in the response of the European
Central Banks relative to the Federal Reserve Bank. A
US slowdown and a large fall in the dollar would
clearly contribute to accelerating the correction of the
US external imbalance. 
Yet it is important to stress that sustained adjustment
of the external imbalance can only occur through a
shift in relative wealth and demand over the medium
and long run, that is well beyond
the time frame of a business cycle
downturn. 
5. Scenarios for the medium
run
If the internal relative prices of
goods and services in the US and
abroad cannot be expected to
move substantially during the
process of external adjustment,
how far can the dollar be expect-
ed to fall in real terms? Once
again, the focus here is not on
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There are reasons to expect a long period of dollar
weakness, but the fall in the US currency required to
foster current account adjustment is likely to be small-
er than suggested by estimates that place a large
weight on the adjustment in non-tradable prices. 
First, changes in wealth and international prices are
bound to have an impact on the level and composi-
tion of output in the US and abroad. Indeed, it is hard
to believe that internal relative price can move by
almost 1/3 without causing significant sectoral shifts
in production, a possibility ruled out by construction
in the example proposed by Obstfeld and Rogoff that
we discussed in Section 2 above. In some other
examples by the same authors, it is indeed shown
that, for given demand elasticities, the need for inter-
nal price adjustment and therefore real dollar depre-
ciation can decrease considerably if the composition
of US output by sector changes in favour of tradables
as a response to relative-price movements (see
Obstfeld and Rogoff 2007). 
5.1 Rebalancing and market dynamics
A relatively small dollar depreciation is predicted in
several recent contributions that develop a variety of
models, allowing for some adjustment in the level and
composition of output. The numerical exercises pro-
posed by Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2008), for
instance, suggest that closing the US current account
deficit (from 5 percent of GDP to zero) could lead to a
combination of lower US consumption (– 6 percent),
and higher US employment (+ 3 percent), relative to
trend. This would then correspond to a rate of real dol-
lar depreciation of the order of 20 percent. 
Because of entry and exit of new firms and product
varieties in the export market over time, the “re-
quired” dollar depreciation could actually become
smaller than 20 percent (even substantially smaller;
see Corsetti Martin and Pesenti 2007), without 
necessarily changing the adjustment in consumption
and employment (which could still be – 6 percent
and + 3 percent, respectively). These results are par-
ticularly noteworthy, because they suggest that the
macroeconomic costs of current account adjustment
(in terms of consumption and employment) are not
necessarily increasing in the extent of real dollar
depreciation. 
Key to these scenarios is the degree of economic flex-
ibility and adaptability of both the US economy and
the economies in the rest of the world. In the baseline
exercise, adjustment would coincide with some con-
traction in the US non-tradables good sector (– 2 per-
cent), coupled by a substantial expansion in tradables,
both for the domestic market (+ 11 percent) and for
the foreign markets (+ 24 percent). The idea is that
product innovation and differentiation could reduce
the need for a large weakening of the international
prices of US products. Observe that in light of this
consideration, in the next few years European firms
can be expected to face much stronger competition by
firms overseas, even if the adjustment in the exchange
rate turns out to be modest.
5.2 A multi-country model
A similar assessment is presented by Dekle, Eaton
and Kortum (2007), based on a quite different model.
These authors build a multilateral model calibrated to
40 countries using 2004 data on GDP and bilateral
trade flows in manufacturing goods.
Table 2.1 reports gross and net trade in manufactures
for a subset of countries considered in this study. The
table includes 14 European countries, Japan, China,
India, and the US. Observe that ten of the 14 Euro-
pean countries included in the table run a deficit, the
other four a surplus. The largest deficits are run by the
UK, Spain and the area comprising Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxemburg, i.e. the Benelux coun-
tries. The largest surpluses are run by Germany, Ire-
land, Sweden and Finland. 
These authors ask what would happen, in general
equilibrium, if manufacturing trade deficits around
the world had to be adjusted to set all current account
balances equal to zero. The target adjustment is
reported in the fourth column in the table, under the
heading “Counterfactual balance”. For the US, the
counterfactual balance is of course staggering: it
requires a shift from a deficit of almost 500 billion US
dollars to a surplus of 180 billion US dollars. Simi-
larly large is the required adjustments with the oppo-
site sign, for China and Japan.
Observe that depending on the overall current
account in 2004, the “Counterfactual balance” re-
quires significant adjustment also in Europe. Notably,
the surplus in Germany is cut by one half; the surplus
should turn into a deficit in Sweden; the external
deficit run by Benelux countries substantially
widens. On the other hand, Italy is required to in-
crease its manufacturing surplus. Ireland’s external
position is unaffected. What is the magnitude of the macroeconomic adjust-
ment required to engineer such a fix of external
imbalances? The surprising answer is that according
to the trade model adopted in the exercise, the magni-
tude of adjustment is, on average, small.
Strikingly limited is the implied adjustment of rel-
ative wages (labour costs). For example, wages in
the country with the largest deficit (US) fall only
by 10 percent relative to wages in the country with
the largest surplus, which is Japan. Overall, the rel-
ative wage of the US must adjust by about 7 per-
cent. Among the European countries in the table,
relative wage appreciation is quite contained
everywhere except for Norway. Relative wage
depreciation is expected for Greece, Portugal,
Spain and the UK.
In all these countries, however, wages hardly change
in real terms, mostly because of the large component
of non-tradables in total consumption but also
because of a home bias in domestic spending on man-
ufacturing goods. Overall, wages move by approxi-
mately 1 percent in real terms, with the exception of
Norway where they increase by 4.2 percent (see
Deckle et al. 2007 for details).
Changing trade elasticities clearly affects the numer-
ical estimates from the exercise. In some robustness
checks using a lower elasticity, the size of relative
wage adjustment in the US rises but only up to 18
percent relative to China and 20 percent relative to
Japan. The adjustment in US real wages is barely
affected. 
5.3 Beyond trade-related considerations
The two exercises reviewed above are similar in spir-
it to the ones proposed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005
and 2007): they are static in nature and largely focus
on the equilibrium relative price adjustment required
to correct “global imbalances”. For this very reason,
however, they prove that general-equilibrium trade
models do not necessarily support the view that sub-
stantial correction is possible only with a very large
real dollar adjustment.
It should be stressed that these calculations are not
forecasts. They point to plausible outcomes in a world
where a large debtor (the US) starts to service its debt,
therefore compressing domestic demand relative to
foreign demand. But the exchange rate is driven by
many different factors. For instance, an especially
important one, which we have not treated explicitly, is
relative productivity growth (and market expectations
about it). Many observers believe that the differential
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Table 2.1  












Austria 82.4 83.5  –  1.1  –  3.1  1.2 
Belgium, the Netherlands
and Luxemburg  307.8  371.6  – 63.7  – 136.8  1.5 
Denmark 42.6  52.2  –  9.5  –  16.7  4.6 
Finland 50.5  36.2  14.4  3.4  5.2 
France 333.0 338.2  –  5.3  –  0.3  0.4 
Germany 750.9  541.4  209.5  106.5  3.1 
Greece 9.3  38.9  – 29.5  – 17.3  – 11.2 
Ireland 115.2  49.1  66.2  66.0  0 
Italy 278.3  257.1  21.2  35.6  0 
Norway 22.8 39.2  –  16.4  –  52.4  34.5 
Portugal 29.9  40.6  – 10.7  – 1.0  – 6.1 
Spain  132.0  194.7  – 62.8  – 9.1  – 4.8 
Sweden 100.3  77.1  23.2  –  5.5  7.3 
United Kingdom 254.5  363.7  – 109.2  – 75.3  – 1.4 
China and Hong Kong  816.8  695.0  121.8  36.2  2.5 
India 58.5  53.1  5.4  –  2.7  1.7 
Japan 545.2  268.2  277.0  103.7  3.7 
United States 673.7  1159.3  – 484.6  179.4  – 6.8 
(a) Data are for 2004 in billions of US$. – (b) Percentage change.
Source: Deckle et al., (2007), Table 2.EEAG Report 69
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in favour of the US, which seems to have driven much
of the current account deficits from the mid-1990s on,
has now substantially fallen. 
Nonetheless, an additional reason why the dollar fall
need not be dramatic has to do with the currency and
asset class composition of the US external portfolio
(including both gross assets and gross liabilities). As
is well known, most of the US debt is denominated
in dollars, whereas a large fraction of this country’s
external assets are denominated in foreign currency.
In the short run, these differences may provide
opportunities for the US to alleviate the burden of its
foreign debt through exchange rate depreciation:
other things equal, dollar depreciation raises the
value in dollars of foreign-currency denominated
assets owned by the US, without affecting the value
of the dollar-denominated liabilities of this country.
As the current account is the difference in the value
of net foreign assets between the beginning and the
end of a year:
Current Account = Change in Net Financial Assets,
any revaluation of foreign assets held by US residents
would clearly reduce the external deficit for a given
value of net exports. This mechanism creates a poten-
tially important channel through which international
price movements cause valuation effects which feed
back into the overall external position of a country,
much discussed in recent research work (see Chapter
2 of EEAG 2005 for a discussion).
While dollar depreciation can generate short-run
gains, the abuse of the opportunity to manipulate val-
ues through the exchange rate would create dynamic
risks. The main risk is that excessive and/or systemat-
ic recourse to depreciation would convince interna-
tional investors to redirect their portfolios away from
dollar-denominated assets, ultimately raising issues
about how to finance the US external deficit. But the
US monetary authorities are well aware of the need to
maintain confidence in the dollar.
6. Conclusions
Closing the US current account deficit does require a
weak dollar, but current assessments of global rebal-
ancing differ regarding the required real dollar depre-
ciation. In this chapter we have argued that, in the
leading model of current account adjustment, esti-
mates of large real depreciation presuppose a strong
fall in the relative price of domestic non-tradables
within the US economy. In light of the evidence from
the 1980s as well as of the results from econometric
studies, such sizeable corrections in internal relative
prices, larger than changes in the US terms of trade,
are quite unlikely. 
According to recent studies, the magnitude of a real
depreciation that would insure a sustainable correc-
tion of the US external imbalance may well be in the
range of 10–20 percent, perhaps even less, in real
effective terms. By these standards, the real depre-
ciation of the dollar, especially vis-à-vis the euro, is
more likely to have reached, and probably overshot,
the parity that is consistent with a global correction
of imbalances. 
This consideration does not exclude much sharper
movements over the next few quarters or even in the
next few years, in the early phases of the correction
(see Krugman 2007 for a particularly sharp analysis
of this point). But the economic forces at play do not
necessarily support scenarios of sustained extreme
dollar depreciation.
We should also stress that possible substantial move-
ments in the dollar, especially taking into account the
possibility of overshooting, do not necessarily coin-
cide with a dollar crisis. A dollar crisis could occur if
there were to be an abrupt decline of the dollar as the
main international reserve and vehicle currency. For
instance, a premise for such a crisis could be a sudden
sell-off of dollar reserves by monetary authorities
around the world. While we do not attach any signif-
icant probability to such an event, we find it important
to stress that a dollar crisis would be quite harmful to
the process of global rebalancing. Financial turmoil
would seriously undermine the foundations of world
asset market integration. Even more damaging is the
possibility that an abrupt depreciation of the dollar
could trigger strong protectionist pressures especially
in Europe.
Even without an extreme dollar depreciation, howev-
er, the correction of global imbalances can be expect-
ed to entail significant macroeconomic adjustment
both in the US and in Europe. European firms are
already facing much stronger and increasing competi-
tion from US firms. As there will be some reallocation
of resources from the non-tradable to the tradable sec-
tor in the US, the opposite can be expected to happen
in Europe. 
The intensity of these effects is likely to differ across
countries. While the current account for the euroarea as a whole is roughly balanced, there are sub-
stantial differences among countries. This also
applies to the degree of openness and to competi-
tiveness. One of the exercises reviewed in this chap-
ter assumes an even distribution of adjustment
across all countries. In this exercise, Germany would
reduce its surplus by one half, while Italy is expect-
ed to gain competitiveness. Unfortunately, there is
no guarantee that adjustment in Europe will be even.
With different degrees of flexibility in economic
structures, Europe runs the risk of facing a period of
strong divergence in growth rates and external
adjustments. Dealing with this risk is well beyond
the reach of the European Central Bank, and is defi-
nitely not a reason for increasing deficit spending,
which can at best provide some short-run relief. The
need for correcting the global imbalances instead
raises the social value of investment in reforming the
goods and the labour markets at the national level,
along the lines amply discussed in several earlier
EEAG reports.
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